Correlations of the type discussed by EPR in their original 1935 paradox for continuous variables exist for the quadrature phase amplitudes of two spatially separated fields. These correlations were experimentally reported in 1992. We propose to use such EPR beams in quantum cryptography, to transmit predetermined messages in such a way that the receiver and sender may later determine whether eavesdropping has occurred.
Intriguing is the possibility of using quantum mechanics to transmit signals in a way that any eavesdropping can be detected by the receiver and sender. This new field of quantum cryptography [1, 2] has attracted much attention.
In the pioneering proposal of Bennett and Brassard Other proposals [2] suggest to use a sequence of two spatially separated photons with correlated polarisation, and whose joint polarisation measurements are predicted by quantum mechanics to show a violation of a Bell inequality [3] . Such fields have no local hidden variable interpretation. Any measurement, and subsequent state regeneration to mask interference, by an eavesdropper along one of these two channels will alter the statistics so that a Bell inequality is always satisfied. Again a fundamental aspect of quantum mechanics is utilized to alert receiver and sender to eavesdropping.
The proposals so far focus on the use of single photons to transmit information. A significant limitation to the practicality of such schemes is the poor efficiency of photon counting detectors. This contributes to a significant loss factor which makes direct efficient communication of sequences predetermined by Alice difficult [4] . Photon-based proposals rely in practice on deciphering a sequence (key) a posteriori from infrequent detected photons.
Our approach [5] is to point out the potential of using a different cryptographic scheme based on measurement of (continuous variable) field quadrature phase amplitudes. Correlations of the type discussed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) in their original 1935 paradox [6] , for continuous variables, exist for the quadrature phase amplitudes of two spatially separated fields [7] . The technology of quadrature phase amplitude measurement is sufficiently advanced that in 1992 these correlations were detected, without detection efficiency problems, by Ou et al [8] . Such EPR correlated beams have recently been utilized to enable quantum state teleportation with continuous variables [9] . Further recent work [10] has shown that quadrature phase amplitude measurements on certain twin beams can predict a violation of Bell inequalities.
In this paper we show how such EPR correlated beams may be used to transmit a predetermined message (or key) directly from sender to receiver, where later communication through a public channel between sender and receiver can check whether eavesdropping has occurred. The scheme involves only quadrature phase amplitude measurements, which can be performed with high efficiency. The predetermined nature of the sequence could aid incorporation of special repeaters, where the signal and correlated beams are regenerated to help compensate for transmission loss.
Consider the nondegenerate parametric down conversion process, modeled in simplistic fashion by two field modes with boson operatorsâ andb, with the interaction Hamiltonian
. We define the quadrature phase amplitudesX a = (â +â † ) andP a = (â −â † )/i, with similar definitions for the modeb. The Heisenberg uncertainty relation for the orthogonal amplitudes of modeâ is ∆ 2 X a ∆ 2 P a ≥ 1. The output quadrature amplitudes
where κ is proportional to the strength of the parametric interaction and the t = 0 operators represent inputs. As κt increases,X a (t) becomes increasingly correlated withX b (t), and P a (t) becomes increasingly correlated with −P b (t), the correlation becoming perfect in the limit κT → ∞. With output fieldsâ andb spatially separated, this is the situation [7] of the 1935 EPR correlations.
For nonideal correlation, the degree of correlation may still be sufficient to ensure EPR correlations [7] . The results for measurementsX a (t) andX b (t) (orP a (t) andP b (t)) can be compared, yielding an estimate of the error in inferring the result of measurementX a (t) on modeâ, based on a measurementX b (t) on modeb. We calculate δ x =X a (t) − γX b (t) and δ p =P a (t) + γP b (t), where the factor γ may be modified to give the minimum error.
One can calculate the variances associated with the inference ofX a from γX b , andP a from
) occurs for a particular value of γ. Finding the turning point with
where < x, y >=< xy > − < x >< y > and one deduces a ∆ 2 p,inf,min in similar fashion.
EPR correlations are obtained when the product ∆ 2 x,inf ∆ 2 p,inf drops below the quantum limit given by ∆ 2 X a ∆ 2 P a ≥ 1 [7] :
For arbitrary coherent input states, we predict from the solution (1) that [7] (γ = tanh 2κt)
An identical argument and results hold if the measured operators are X a − < X a >, X b − < X b >, P a − < P a > and P b − < P b >, the fluctuations about the mean, as opposed to X a , X b , P a and P b .
For the purposes of cryptography [11] , Alice chooses as input to the nondegenerate parametric amplifier [12] one of two possible states: the input forâ is either a coherent state |α 0 > a (bit value 1) or a coherent state |iα 0 > a (bit value 0), where α 0 is real. The input forb is a vacuum state |0 > b . The signal is transmitted by spatially separating the two output fields and propagating to Bob the output field of modeâ. Bob can read the message by measuring eitherX a (t) orP a (t). Suppose Bob chooses to measureX a (t). The probability distribution for his obtaining a result x, given Alice's choice |iα 0 >, is the gaussian
with mean zero and standard deviation σ = cosh 2 κt + sinh 2 κt. If
Alice chose |α 0 > the probability for Bob's outcome is exp [
the gaussian mean shifted to 2α 0 cosh κt. Provided σ ≪ 2α 0 cosh κt, the bit value is clearly determined from Bob's result x: x near 2α 0 cosh κt implies 1; x near zero implies 0. The bit value can also be determined by a measurement of quadrature phase amplitudeP a (t), in this case the input |α 0 > giving the gaussian distribution about zero (bit value 1), while |iα 0 > gives the distribution centered about 2α 0 cosh κt (bit value 0).
Bob records the results of his consecutive quadrature phase measurements, randomly selecting to measure eitherX a (t) orP a (t), and subtracting from his result either 2α 0 cosh κt or zero, so that only the fluctuation about the mean of the particular distribution is recorded.
Bob then communicates to Alice, through a public channel, the sequence of recorded fluctuations together with measurements (X a (t) orP a (t)) chosen (the bit value itself is not communicated [13] .
The presence of loss due to transmission need not effect the determination of the signal, since α 0 can be made sufficiently large. However the degree of EPR correlation is affected by loss. Loss, and also detection inefficiencies, may be modeled by a beam splitter which mixes our signal modeâ with a vacuum fieldâ vac to give a new output at Bob's detector:
Here η is the overall efficiency factor. The new noise levels measured by
With η less than one, a partial loss, EPR correlations are still maintained, though decreased.
Only in the limit of complete loss do we obtain ∆ 2
In practice, the degree of EPR correlation for a given transmission distance would be accurately established. The solutions show us that this degree of correlation is independent of Alice's choice of input coherent state. Any increase of our EPR noise indicator above this pre-evaluated level alerts Bob to the additional loss or interference caused by a partial tapping of the channel by Eve. A continual tapping by Eve will bring levels back to 1.
The terminology "EPR correlations" in this paper does not imply correlations which violate a Bell inequality. However schemes using the nonlocal aspect of quantum mechanics [2] can also be proposed for quadrature phase detection, since the failure of local realism has recently [10] been predicted possible for such measurements, for certain types of quantum states. One such state is the pair-coherent state [10] |Ψ >= N
Here N is a normalisation coefficient, we choose r 0 = 1.1 and |α > q (q = a, b) is a coherent state for the modeq. Also we might consider the two-mode "Schrodinger cat" state undergoing interaction for a time t with a parametric amplifier to give the "squeezed cat state" [10] |Ψ >= NÛ
where U = exp [−iĤ I t/h], and we choose α 0 = β 0 = 0.9 and κt = 0.6
After generation of the state (5) (or (6)), the two fieldsâ andb are spatially separated.
Alice may then choose to phase shift the fieldâ by 180 o or not, this choice of relative phase betweenâ andb being her signal [14] . The fieldâ is then propagated to Bob at a distant location A.
The nonlocal aspect of these fields could be used to detect eavesdropping. The signal is Bob may build up, for each block, the probability distribution P (q a , q b ) for getting results q a and q b upon measurement ofX a atâ andX b atb respectively. This information is given by the θ = 0 and φ = 0 measurements. The shape of the distribution changes with the choice of phase shift, and gives the bit value. This information is not determinable from the measurements of amplitudes made onb alone, and hence cannot be determined by the information passed along the public channel.
To check whether eavesdropping has occurred, Bob constructs a test of a Bell inequality as follows. The result of the measurement is classified as +1 if the quadrature phase result x is greater than or equal to zero, and −1 otherwise. We define the probability distributions: ; and P AB ++ (θ, φ) the joint probability of obtaining a +1 result at botĥ a andb. The existence of a local hidden variable theory implies the "strong" Bell-ClauserHorne inequality [3] .
For state (5), a violation of this inequality occurs with S ≈ 1.0157, and with angles given by [10] . For state (6) , violation given by S = 1.008 is obtained for angles θ = 0.42π, φ = −0.28π, θ ′ = 0.28π, φ ′ = 0.42π [10] . The above violations also hold for the states generated by phase shiftingâ by 180 o , with the choice of angles for φ as before, but replacing θ with θ + π and θ ′ with θ ′ + π.
Violation of the Bell inequality at the level predicted by quantum mechanics ensures that no interference by an eavesdropper (Eve) has occurred alongâ (see Ekert [2] for spin-1/2 systems). Suppose Eve performs a measurement on the fieldâ, measuringX 
where P (x θ 0 , θ 0 ) is the probability that Eve obtains a result x θ 0 for her measurement. We have the form P In terms of current feasibility, the second scheme based on the Bell inequality is more likely to be limited by difficulty of state preparation and susceptibility to loss (η = 0.96 destroys violations [10] ).
The first scheme, not so limited by these issues, may offer advantages over schemes utilizing photon counting. The high detection efficiencies give a very much reduced overall loss factor, which may make it possible to transmit directly and efficiently a predetermined message, while later checking provides a means to check security. The generation and detection of EPR correlations with ∆ 2 x,inf ∆ 2 p,inf = 0.7 has been achieved [8] . The generation of squeezed (where ∆ 2X A θ < 1 for some θ) optical and soliton pulses [15] opens up possibilities for transmission of EPR correlated fields. The robustness of squeezing to propagation loss has not been keenly explored experimentally, but similar distances should be achievable for EPR correlations. This loss represents the chief limitation to secure long distance transmission, since loss acts to degrade the EPR correlations which must be kept at ∆ 2 x,inf ∆ 2 p,inf < 1.
Repeated detection and regeneration of new EPR fields with signal encoded could help combat loss. Security then relies on a set of senders and receivers being able to communicate reliably at a later stage, after the detections [16] .
